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Sadly, progress in AI has confirmed earlier conclusions, 
reached using formal domains, about the strict limits of 
human information processing and has also shown that these 
limits are only partly remedied by  intuition. More 
positively, AI offers mankind a unique avenue to circumvent 
its cognitive limits: (1) by acting as a prosthesis extending 
processing capacity and size of the knowledge base; (2) by 
offering tools for studying our own cognition; and (3) as a 
consequence of the previous item, by developing tools that 
increase the quality and quantity of our own thinking. These 
ideas are illustrated with chess expertise. 
 
 
“...The main thing needed to make the 
world happy is intelligence. And this, 
after all, is an optimistic conclusion, 
because intelligence is a thing that can 




In itself, the result of the Deep Blue vs. Kasparov match 
does not matter much (except perhaps to Kasparov). The 
fact is that almost all chess players are vastly outperformed 
by Deep Blue and that only a handful of grandmasters can 
put up any kind of fight against it, as against most chess 
computers, for that matter. As I will illustrate in this paper, 
this is but one further episode in the machines vs. humans 
saga, where humans typically get the worst of it. I will also 
show that, although humans’ egos may be hurt in the 
process, this outcome is not a reason for gloom. Artificial 
Intelligence1 (AI) can help us improve our lives. 
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 The study of human expertise is a hot topic. Top journals 
in psychology and cognitive science, such Psychological 
Review, Cognitive Psychology or Cognitive Science, are 
replete with studies on expert perception, expert memory, 
and expert problem solving. As more and more becomes 
known about the psychology of experts, the following 
conclusion seems inescapable: experts in many domains 
perform poorly as compared to non-human standards. 
 It has been known for quite a while that humans perform 
poorly in highly formal tasks, such as logic (Wason and 
Johnson-Laird 1976). It has also been known that even 
experts do not handle basic rules of probability correctly; 
for example, they constantly misuse base-rate probability 
(Dawes 1988; Kahneman et al., 1982). Even worse, it has 
been shown repeatedly, starting with Meehl (1954), that 
experts in  clinical diagnosis are outperformed by simple 
mathematical predictions tools, such as regression analysis, 
even when the regression weights are chosen randomly 
(Dawes 1988). Perhaps, one explanation for these results is 
that there is a fundamental (architectural)  difficulty for us 
in combining several variables simultaneously. 
Chess and intuition 
Of course, it is well known that formal techniques do not 
work in some domains of expertise, either because of their 
computational complexity or because of the difficulty in 
fitting the domain into the procrustean bed of mathematics. 
In such domains, however, humans do manage to reach 
solutions, perhaps by “intuition” (this unspecified but often 
proposed mechanism allows, according to its proponents, a 
holistic understanding of the situation). Chess is a case in 
point, often used by opponents of classical AI (e.g., 
                                                                                 
 
1
 I will use  “Artificial Intelligence”  in a broad sense in the paper, 
including hardware and software, and including some fields that are 
normally encompassed under computer science, such as data base 
management. 
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Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986; Dreyfus, 1992; Puccetti 1974) 
and/or defenders of intuition (de Groot 1986) as a domain  
where symbolic, rule-based thinking techniques are vastly 
outperformed by human holistic,  perceptual thinking. But 
how good are human solutions in these domains? To 
answer this question, let us have a look at some empirical 
results.  Again, chess is a good choice, because it is one of 
the most studied domains in research on expertise. 
 Research has clearly established that perception plays a 
key role in human chess expertise. This is reflected in a 
series of quite amazing abilities that experts have 
developed  in the process of reaching their level,  and that 
differentiate them from novices. For example, experts’ eye 
movements show that they look faster at the key elements 
of a chess position (de Groot and Gobet 1996). This allows 
them, as was shown by De Groot, Chase and Simon, to 
remember positions much better than weaker players 
(Chase and Simon 1973; de Groot 1965)—they can even 
recall random positions better, though not as well as game 
positions (Gobet and Simon 1996a). This also allows them 
to search the problem space very selectively, homing in 
rapidly on the important variations and pruning many 
irrelevant branches of the search tree. Empirical evidence 
for the latter fact comes from rapid-transit chess 
(Calderwood et al., 1988) and from simultaneous games 
(Gobet and Simon 1996b). For example, Kasparov plays 
roughly at his normal strength when simultaneously 
opposed to eight Masters of international level.  
 
 With progress in AI, however, things are turning sour for 
the proponents of the idea that intuition offers a satisfactory 
palliative for search: computers are showing us that world 
experts are not that good even in “preserved” domains such 
as chess, where mathematical and statistical tools cannot be 
applied practically. Chess grandmasters and masters are 
now regularly outperformed by computers. Even worse, 
comparison with endgame databases show that they play 
rather poorly in endings that are considered as elementary 
in textbooks. Consider the ending King-Queen vs. King-
Rook, which is typically dealt with in a few pages in 
endgame textbooks. In a fascinating piece of research, 
Jansen (1992) has shown that even world-class 
grandmasters regularly make errors that make winning the 
game take on average four times longer than the optimal 
line of play. Because of the presence of the so-called fifty-
move rule, this means that, in many cases, they would 
achieve only a draw instead of a win. (In actual play against 
a human opponent, they manage to win faster because the 
defending side makes errors at about the same rate). 
Interestingly, even authors of textbooks, who have the 
opportunity to move the pieces on the board and are not 
subject to time pressure, make errors that would make 
winning take about twice as long as ideally necessary.  
 As mentioned above, chess has often been used to 
illustrate the bankruptcy of rule-based and symbolic 
thinking and the necessity of supposing a holistic mode of 
perception. By contrast, the examples just discussed have 
illustrated situations where these symbolic techniques do 
better than human intuition, and have even shown where 
intuition fails. Whether this trend—the victory of rule-
based rationality—will be confirmed in the future for other 
tasks is a fascinating question. For the time being, I will 
limit myself to addressing the question of what AI can 
contribute to human cognition. 
Lights 
Thus, progress in AI has reinforced the conclusions reached 
earlier by studies of logical and probabilistic reasoning: our 
capacity for thinking correctly is limited indeed. The 
human species, although perhaps a bit smarter than other 
species, is far from having reached a high level of 
rationality. Gone is the concept that reason is the chief 
qualify of our species (to quote Russell again, from Faith 
and Mountains: “We think, it is true, but we think so badly 
that I often feel it would be better if we did not.”). 
Interestingly, one of the main conclusions of the last 30 
years of research in AI has been that it is easy to write 
programs that do better than humans in tasks that tap high-
level cognitive functions, but that it is very hard to even 
approach the low-level perceptual capacities that we share 
with other mammals. 
 Is this a reason to despair about mankind’s rationality? 
No, it is not. This is because AI not only shows our limits, 
but also helps us to overcome them, in several ways. 
 
 First, AI augments our processing capacity and the extent 
of our knowledge base. In chess, use of computers has 
allowed us to solve endgame questions that had been 
studied for centuries, and for which quite inaccurate 
conclusions had sometimes been reached. A typical 
example is  the celebrated endgame King-Queen-g_Pawn 
vs. King-Queen, where theoreticians (incorrectly) proposed 
that the best defense was to place the King away from the 
Pawn. It also allows one to use master game databases to 
study statistically endgames that are beyond the scope of 
exhaustive databases and to derive heuristics from the 
statistical regularities of these endgames (Sturman, 1996; 
Timoshchenko, 1993). Examples include the relative 
strengths of Bishop vs. Knight.  A final example is offered 
by Althöfer’s experiments showing that a human 
“collaborating” with a computer produces a game that is 
superior to that of the human and the computer taken 
individually (Altöfer, 1997). 
 In domains more pressing than chess, such as technology 
and science, similar techniques, including the data mining 
techniques developed within the Deep Blue technology, 
make it possible to efficiently and routinely process masses 
of data the analysis of which was unthinkable twenty years 
ago. As examples from computational chemistry witness, 
they also allow us to search huge problem spaces rapidly 
(Valdes-Perez, 1994). For many of the problems facing 
us—starvation, pollution, economic recession—problems 
that contain thousand of variables interacting in complex 
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ways, this extension to our thinking capability probably 
offers the only hope of finding a solution.  
 
 Second, AI offers tools for studying our own cognition. 
One the one hand, AI offers us standards with which to 
compare our own performance. There is no doubt that the 
challenges offered by Deep Blue for chess and Chinook for 
checkers opened up new dimensions in the play of 
Kasparov and the late Dr. Tinsley, respectively. In addition, 
it is hard to over-estimate the impact of computers on the 
quality of today’s play, particularly in our understanding of 
endgames and openings.  Finally, Jansen (1992) has shown 
how properties of perfect-play databases (in this case, the 
endgame King-Queen vs. King-Rook) can be studied 
theoretically and can be manipulated in order to carry out 
experiments illuminating aspects of human cognition.  
 On the other hand, AI offers us the mean to construct 
complex models of chess cognitive processes, as is 
illustrated in earlier work by Simon (Simon and Barenfeld 
1969; Simon and Gilmartin 1973) and in my own work 
with CHREST (Gobet 1993). These computational models 
are only a modest illustration of the many computational 
models, including Soar (Newell 1990) and ACT-R 
(Anderson 1993) that foster our understanding of cognition.  
 The presence of computational models and of standards 
against which to compare human expertise provides 
powerful tools for cognitive scientists to study our own 
intelligence. It also offers the possibility of elucidating 
puzzling concepts such as “intuition,” which have eluded 
understanding because of the lack of adequate experimental 
environments. With this goal in mind, and given the 
consent of the human players, parameters in Deep Blue 
could be varied in order to systematically study factors 
underlying Grandmasters’ famed intuition. Alternatively, 
Deep Blue parameters could be varied in order to study 
which constellations produce play that human experts 
would deem “intuitive.” The conclusions reached by these 
experiments could be used to implement a computational 
model of intuition. 
 
 Third, and perhaps most importantly, AI allows us to use 
our increased understanding of human cognition to improve 
our own rationality, by developing software that increases 
the quality and quantity of our thinking. In chess, artificial 
tutors are just beginning to make their appearance, offering 
both instructional material and on-line playing advice. But 
outside chess, they are already quite common. The best 
examples of artificial tutors are perhaps offered by 
Anderson’s tutors, based on the ACT-R theory of human 
cognition,  which have been shown to teach skills like LISP 
programming or geometry more effectively than traditional 
methods. It is highly probable that the impact of AI on 
education will be huge in the future (see Anderson et al., 
1995, for a review). 
Conclusion 
It is true that, as AI technology is imported into chess, it 
also modifies the essence of this game. Chess is a highly 
competitive domain in which an AI program may be seen 
either as an unwelcome competitor or as an unfair source of 
help for the opponent. The presence of computers has 
already caused the change of several official chess rules 
and has induced a trend towards more rapid games, where 
external help is more clearly banned than in traditional 3-
minutes-per-move games. Will AI  also change the “rules 
of the game” in domains such as warfare and the economy? 
 In conclusion, AI is both the bad guy and the good guy: 
it pinpoints our limits, but it also allows us to go beyond 
these. As Lord Russell put it so well, intelligence may help 
us be happy. Had Russell lived until the present time of 
blossoming AI, I’m sure that he would have said that 
Artificial Intelligence will be a major contributor to the 
world’ happiness.  
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